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Visual security metrics are deterministic measures with the (claimed) ability to assess whether an en-
cryption method for visual data does achieve its deﬁned goal. These metrics are usually developed to-
gether with a particular encryption method in order to provide an evaluation of said method based on its
visual output. However, visual security metrics themselves are rarely evaluated and the claim to perform
as a visual security metric is not tied to the speciﬁc encryption method for which they were developed. In
this paper, we introduce a methodology for assessing the performance of security metrics based on
common media encryption scenarios. We systematically evaluate visual security metrics proposed in the
literature, along with conventional image metrics which are frequently used for the same task. We show
that they are generally not suitable to perform their claimed task.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The claim of visual security metrics (security metrics for
brevity) is usually the ability to assess the functionality of an en-
cryption method based on the output of the encryption of visual
data. In particular, the evaluation of an encryption method is only
based on the visual output (i.e., the ciphertext), which is either an
image or video. While such metrics are often created in conjunc-
tion with a speciﬁc encryption method and tested, if at all, only for
this encryption method, the claim to perform as a security metric
is usually universal. Furthermore, regular image quality metrics,
such as the frequently used PSNR and SSIM, are also utilized in the
literature to evaluate encryption methods [1–4].
The problem with the evaluation of security metrics is the fact
that there is no established testing methodology. Thus, even if
security metrics are tested, the test is usually based on the eva-
luation procedures for regular image metrics, which are not suf-
ﬁcient to establish whether a method is applicable in the context
of encryption.
Regarding cryptographic security, Shannon's work [5] shows
that the highest level of security is reached when applying a se-
cure cipher to a redundancy free plain text. Current image/video
codecs exploit redundancy for compression and thus we can
consider a bit stream to be an almost redundancy free plain text inr B.V. This is an open access articl
fbauer),the sense of Shannon. Consequently, for maximal security, the
encryption of the entire bit stream with a state-of-the-art cipher,
such as AES, would sufﬁce (“conventional encryption”). Looka-
baugh and Sicker [6] showed that selective encryption is sound
and demonstrated its relation to Shannon's work. However, [7]
showed that side information can compromise security.
However, there are application scenarios which make it ne-
cessary to move away from full encryption. Methods which do not
utilize full encryption of the underlying data are called Light-
weight/Soft/Partial/Selective Encryption. Speciﬁcally, selective en-
cryption is the application of an assumed secure encryption
method to a selected part of the plain text. In selective encryption
the encryption part is assumed to be secure, e.g., by using AES. The
ﬁnal security of the selective encryption comes then from the se-
lection part. What is evaluated in order to gauge the ﬁnal security
of the selective encryption is, to what extent the information left
in plain text can be used to reconstruct an image or video.
Furthermore, an attack on the selective encryption method
does not come from attacking the encryption, but from attacking
the selection. This is usually done by using knowledge about the
original format of the image/video. An attack is usually based on
removing the negative impact on quality by the, essentially ran-
dom, signal introduced by the encryption. This is typically done by
replacing the random signal by a signal which introduces the least
amount of error into the ﬁnal decoding. In order to do so, very
speciﬁc knowledge about the containing format has to be exploi-
ted, and there is usually only a single method to go about this, i.e.,
the attack.e under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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method under test is the format compliance. Format compliance
requires an encrypted bitstream to be decodable by a standards
compliant decoder. In other words, format errors may not be in-
troduced by the encryption. Thus, in the following, when we refer
to an encrypted image/video we mean the image or video that
results from decoding an unattacked encrypted bitstream.
The notion of security in selective encryption is different from
the traditional notion of security: First, we knowingly leave in-
formation in plain text to retain format compliance; second, the
focus is on content security not information security, i.e., the
content should be secure (to some deﬁned extent), while in-
formation about the content might be allowed to leak. In order to
be able to discuss the exact notion of security in such non-con-
ventional encryption schemes, we need to distinguish distinct
application scenarios of encryption schemes for visual data:
Conﬁdentiality encryption: Means MP security (message privacy).
The formal notion is that if a system is MP-secure an attacker
cannot efﬁciently compute any property of the plain text from
the cipher text [8]. This can only be achieved by the con-
ventional encryption approach.Content conﬁdentiality: This is a relaxation of conﬁdential en-
cryption. Side channel information may be reconstructed or
left in plaintext, e.g., header information, packet length, but
the visual content must be secure in the sense that it must not
be intelligible/discernible [9].Sufﬁcient encryption: Means we do not require full security, just
enough security to prevent abuse of the data. The content
must not be consumable due to high distortion (e.g., for DRM
systems) by destroying visual quality to a degree which pre-
vents a pleasant viewing experience or destroys the com-
mercial value. This implicitly refers to message quality se-
curity (MQ), which requires that an adversary cannot re-
construct a higher quality version of the encrypted material
than speciﬁed for the application scenario [10].Perceptual/transparent encryption: Means we want consumers to
be able to view a preview version of the video but in a lower
quality while preventing them from seeing a full version. As
an example: this can be used in a pay per view scheme where
a lower quality preview version is available from the outset to
attract the viewers interest, q.v., [11]. The difference between
sufﬁcient and transparent is the fact that there is no mini-
mum quality requirement for sufﬁcient encryption. Encryp-
tion schemes which can do sufﬁcient encryption cannot ne-
cessarily ensure a certain quality and are thus unable to
provide transparent encryption.Given these different application scenarios it is clear that de-
pending on the goal, a security metric has to fulﬁll different roles.
For example, under the assumption of sufﬁcient encryption, a gi-
ven security metric would have to evaluate which quality is low
enough to prevent a pleasant viewing experience. In contrast, for
the transparent encryption case, a metric not only has to assess
whether the quality of an image or video is low enough, but also
whether the quality is high enough to be useful to attract interest.
When it comes to content conﬁdentiality the question of quality is
no longer applicable. Content conﬁdentiality requires that image
content must not be identiﬁed by human or automated recogni-
tion. This requirement also has to be maintained for any part of the
image. Image metrics, in general, do not deal with such questions
but rate the overall image quality, the question of intelligibility is
usually not covered at all. A drastic example would be an image
where only a small part of the image is partly visible. Classical
metrics would judge the whole image and consequently wouldattribute a high security, even though a part of the image is still
recognizable which contradicts content conﬁdentiality. Still, it has
to be pointed out that content conﬁdentiality can have different
forms. To prevent a face recognition scheme from working prop-
erly it is sufﬁcient to protect any facial information in a surveil-
lance video, while humans could still be identiﬁed in such a video
by using gait recognition. Furthermore, if the appearance of a
person has to be concealed entirely, a much stronger extent of
protection (i.e., higher security) is required. Finally, conﬁdential
encryption cannot be solely assessed with security metrics since
the scope goes beyond assessing security based on the visual ap-
pearance only. Furthermore, we should note that the application of
security metrics on video is performed at a frame by frame basis in
the literature. We will adopt this model but should note that for
the discussion of conﬁdential encryption motion data is of im-
portance, e.g., in [12] it was shown that a replacement attack
combined with motion information can reveal the content of a
scene even though the visual content of every frame is encrypted.
Consequently, depending on a given application scenario dif-
ferent properties are required from a security metric and different
approaches to construct such a metric might perform better or
worse for some applications scenarios. This dependence on the
evaluation goal of a security metric is hardly ever discussed in the
papers introducing a metric. Sufﬁcient and transparent encryption
scenarios have a clear and distinct link to the traditional notion of
(low) visual quality, while it is highly questionable or at least
doubtful if content conﬁdentiality can be assessed by the classical
quality notion. While the lack of relation to spatial areas of most
security metrics could be compensated in the design to provide
locally varying results, the lack of relation to intelligibility in
general can probably not be easily resolved.
For both, security metrics and regular image metrics, in the
literature we do not ﬁnd any evaluation whether a given metric
can perform the claimed function or how such an evaluation
correlates to actual security. However, for regular image metrics it
is well known that the correlation with human observations over
the full range of possible quality (from high to low quality) does
not imply a good performance on a given subset. More speciﬁcally,
it was pointed out recently that most image metrics perform very
poorly for the low quality range ([13]–using the low quality end of
the LIVE database). For security metrics, not even this question has
been covered so far.
In this paper, we will try to remedy this situation by giving an
overview of requirements regarding security goals and formulat-
ing these requirements into a testing methodology. Based on this
methodology we will evaluate the various security metrics in the
literature as well as applicable conventional image metrics. How-
ever, we will not deal with every application scenario equally ex-
plicitly. We will only make a ﬁrst step to cover the content con-
ﬁdentiality scenario. The main reason for this is a lack of ground
truth. It is not obvious how to generate ground truth for this
scenario since there is a disparity between how an image metric
works and what is necessary to evaluate content conﬁdentiality.
Image metrics, and as an extension security metrics, measure the
quality of an image respective to human judgement. This works
well for high quality images but suffers for low quality images
where human observers can have difﬁculties differentiating be-
tween the severity of an impairment. Thus the methodology to
systematically generate ground truth based on human observation
needs to be changed for content conﬁdentiality which is not in the
scope of this paper. On the other hand, for the image quality-re-
lated scenarios (sufﬁcient and transparent encryption), ground
truth data is available, in the form of image impairment databases
with mean opinion scores (MOS) based on a number of human
observations.
In the following we will motivate and introduce a methodology
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methodology can, and should, be used to asses newly developed
metrics.
To motivate this, we will give an overview of security metrics
used in the literature in Section 2. We will not analyse why metrics
fail and the presented counterexamples should be seen as a proof
by contradiction rather than a exhaustive list of failings. Note that
this is a question of generality, we do not dispute that certain
metrics are a good ﬁt for speciﬁc encryption types.
In Section 3 we will describe what is expected of security
metrics and the methodology how security metrics can be eval-
uated. This is done by providing certain desirable traits of a se-
curity metric, a motivation for the traits and a formal description
of the traits to allow measuring them.
In Section 4 we will present the evaluation of state-of-the-art
metrics and measure their ability to perform as security metrics.
This is done based on the traits introduced in Section 3 and shows
the usefulness of these traits to ﬁnd shortcomings of current
metrics and to prevent the same shortcomings in future metrics.
Section 5 will conclude the paper and give a list of state-of-the-
art reference metrics and their usability as security metrics.2. Overview of security metrics
In this section a brief overview of security metrics will be given.
The metrics discussed are taken from the recent literature and are
speciﬁcally designed to ascertain whether the image quality after
encryption is sufﬁciently reduced. The metrics given in this section
are discussed as general security metrics, i.e., not limited to the
speciﬁc method with which they were designed together. Refer-
ences to the original work will be given for each security metric as
well as some examples where the metric fails to assess given ex-
ample images as would be expected from a general security me-
tric. The SSIM and PSNR are also included in this overview. Even
though they were not designed to be security metrics, they are
frequently used as such, e.g., [3,14–16] (SSIM), [4,17–19] (PSNR)
and [1,2] (SSIM and PSNR).
Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR): The peak signal-to-noise ratio
(PSNR) is still widely used because it is unrivaled in speed and ease
of use. The PSNR is a quality metric, meaning a high metric score
reﬂects a high quality, which gives a score in the range [ ∞]0, .
However, it is also well known that the correlation to human
judgement is somewhat lacking even for high and medium quality
[20]. Fig. 1 illustrates the performance of the PSNR metric on
samples from the IVC-SelectEncrypt [21] database (see Section 3).
Structural Similarity Index Measure (SSIM): The structural simi-
larity index measure (SSIM) [22] extracts three separate scores
from the image and combines them into the ﬁnal score. First the
visual inﬂuence is calculated locally then luminance, contrast and
structural scores are calculated globally. These separate scores areFig. 1. PSNR metric scores for images from the IVC-SelectEncrypt database. According to
less secure than (a) and (b).then combined with equal weight to form the SSIM score. The
SSIM is a quality metric, a high metric score reﬂects a high quality,
which gives a score in the range [ ]0, 1 . Fig. 2 illustrates the per-
formance of the SSIM metric on samples from the IVC-SelectEn-
crypt database.
Edge Similarity Score (ESS): The edge similarity score (ESS) was
introduced in [23] and uses localized edge direction information to
compare two images. The ESS is a quality metric, a high metric
score reﬂects a high quality, which gives a score in the range [ ]0: 1 .
Fig. 3 illustrates the performance of the ESS metric on the foreman
sequence when encryption according to [24] is applied in com-
parison to white noise.
Luminance Similarity Score (LSS): The luminance similarity score
(LSS) was introduced in [23] and uses localized luminosity in-
formation to compare two images. The LSS is a quality metric, a
high metric score reﬂects a high quality, which gives a score in the
range [ − ]8.5: 1 . Fig. 4 illustrates the performance of the LSS
metric on the foreman sequence when encryption according to
[25] is applied in comparison to noise.
Neighborhood Similarity Degree (NSD): The neighborhood simi-
larity degree metric (NSD), introduced in [26], uses local pixel si-
milarity correlation between original and impaired image. The
NSD depends on two parameters, one to deﬁne the region for pixel
similarity correlation (d) and one to deﬁne the similarity threshold
(m). The parameters m and d were set to the same values as in the
experiments in [26], i.e., m¼5, d¼3, border extension is done by
repeating the last border pixel. The NSD is an impairment metric, a
high metric score reﬂects a low quality, which gives a score in the
range [ ]0: 1 . Fig. 5 illustrates the performance of the NSD metric on
samples from the IVC-SelectEncrypt database.
Local Entropy (LE): The local entropy metric was introduced in
[27] (LE), it is a no reference metric operating only on an impaired
image. The LE metric uses the average of normalized localized
entropy scores, on 88 blocks, as image quality predictor. The LE
is an impairment metric, a high metric score reﬂects a low quality,
which gives a score in the range [ ]0: 1 . Fig. 6 illustrates the per-
formance of the LE metric on samples from the IVC-SelectEncrypt
database.
Local Feature Based Visual Security (LFBVS): The local feature
based visual security metric (LFBVS) was introduced in [28] and
utilizes localized edge and luminance features which are com-
bined and weighted according to error magnitude, i.e., error
pooling. The LFBVS is an impairment metric, a high metric score
reﬂects a low quality, which gives a score in the range [ ]0: 1 . Fig. 7
illustrates the performance of the LFBVS metric on the silent se-
quence when encryption according to [24] is applied in compar-
ison to white noise.
All the given image metrics, with the exception of the local
entropy metric (LE), are full reference metrics, meaning they uti-
lize information from the original and comparison (encrypted)
image to calculate an assessment of the visual similarity. The localPSNR images (a) and (b) are of the same quality and (c) is of much higher quality, i.e.,
Fig. 2. SSIM metric scores for images from the IVC-SelectEncrypt database. According to SSIM images (a) and (b) are of the same quality and (c) is of much lower quality, i.e.,
more secure than (a) and (b).
Fig. 3. ESS comparison for frame 80 of the foreman sequence (a). ESS judges the white noise (c) to be of higher quality than the residual information from the encrypted
frame (d). In order to show the amount of information actually retained in the encrypted frame a post processed version is also shown (b).
Fig. 4. LSS comparison for a frame of the foreman sequence (c). LSS judges the noise (a) to be of higher quality than the residual information from the encrypted frame (b).
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only the impaired image to judge the resulting quality. By mea-
suring entropy, LE can also be interpreted to assess the encrypted
image compared to random noise (which exhibits maximal LE).
Since all of the given security metrics are proposed to be general
we will not differentiate between full- and non-reference metrics
in the following but compare them solely on the task they are
supposed to solve.Fig. 5. NSD metric scores for images from the IVC-SelectEncrypt database. According to
more secure than (a) and (b).From the description of the various security metrics it can be
seen that a wide range of approaches exist, from metrics targeting
signal properties, e.g., PSNR which targets noise, to LE which tar-
gets local entropy, metrics which use higher level information, e.g.,
NSD or ESS which use a form of object detection (mostly based on
edges), to metrics which use information about the HVS to im-
prove their performance, e.g., SSIM or LFBS which use simulation
of the fovea centralis and error pooling respectively. However, forNSD images (a) and (b) are of the same quality and (c) is of much lower quality, i.e.,
Fig. 6. LE metric scores for images from the IVC-SelectEncrypt database. According to LE images (a) and (b) are of the same quality and (c) is of much lower quality, i.e., more
secure than (a) and (b).
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obvious fault in the performance of the given metric. Such ex-
amples can be found for every metric of course, the question we
will try to answer in the following sections is whether the de-
monstrated fault is singular or systemic.
In order to gauge the effectiveness of a dedicated security
metric it is useful to compare them to regular metrics. To facilitate
a fair comparison, three recent metrics, in addition to PSNR and
SSIM, are chosen and included in the evaluation. The local edge
gradient image metric (LEG) [29] shows a good correlation with
human judgement and is reasonably fast to compute such that it
can be used even under time constraints. The visual information
ﬁdelity (VIF) [30] and CPA1 [31] outperform the SSIM and LEG in
regard to correlation with human judgement but are a lot slower
to compute [29]. A second reason to include those metrics is to
gauge whether they can be used as security metrics. The LEG and
VIF are quality metrics with a score in the range [ ]0, 1 , and the
CPA1 is an impairment metric with a score in [ ∞]0, .3. Evaluation methodology
In this section we outline (1) our evaluation methodology,
(2) the reason to use this methodology, and (3) the application
scenario(s) which can be assessed by employing a certain meth-
odology. A discussion of the desired outcome from these tests for
security metrics is also provided. This section is the guideline of
how security metrics and image metrics are evaluated for the use
as security metrics in Section 4.
3.1. Application domain
Selective encryption methods, in a majority of cases, aim at
format-compliant encryption, i.e., encryption in such a way that
the media can be decoded by a standards compliant decoder
without error. Frequently, security metrics are applied on a direct
decoding of the encrypted bitstream. This can have adverse effects
since encryption introduces noise which can hide plain text dataFig. 7. LFBVS comparison for frame 80 of the silent sequence (a). LFBVS judges the
information contained in white noise (c). In order to show the amount of information aand consequently a security metric might judge that an encryption
method is more secure then it actually is. There are a number of
options how a security metric can be applied, as illustrated in
Fig. 8. All security metrics under evaluation are applied on a direct
decoding of the encrypted bitstream (which we will denote as the
encrypted domain) by the authors in the corresponding original
papers. Other options would be to attack the encryption method in
a way which does not break it but reduces the obfuscation of the
plain text data in the encrypted domain (denoted extracted in the
ﬁgure). Such attacks usually utilize knowledge about the bitstream
rather than the encryption method (other than location). Typical
attacks would be error concealment and replacement attacks
against selective encryption schemes [32]. In general, such attacks
replace the encrypted content with bitstream elements that are
statistically known to introduce less noise than the random ele-
ments produced by encryption. Another possibility would be to
utilize post processing to further help the metric detect residual
information (denoted processed in the ﬁgure).
In the evaluation we only handle the difference between se-
curity metrics applied directly in the encrypted domain versus
application in the extracted domain. The post processing step is
only provided to better highlight the remaining information in an
image. It cannot be directly used as an application domain since
the post processing step is either speciﬁc to the encryption, in
which case it should be included in the attack, or speciﬁc to the
metric, in which case it should be included in the security metric.
Post processing, in general, can inﬂuence different metrics in
various ways, an example of this is given in Fig. 9 where post
processing increases ESS and, at the same time, decreases the
SSIM. This means that it is never actually possible to determine an
optimal postprocessing method which would be required in a
sensible assessment.
In order to test whether a security metric can operate in the
encrypted domain a number of well known video sequences have
been encrypted for three target qualities, utilizing EZBC encryption
methods described in [24]. To generate the different target quali-
ties the selective encryption was applied to either all I-frames (low
quality), low frequency bands of all frames (medium quality), andresidual information from the encrypted frame (d) to be about the same as the
ctually retained in the encrypted frame a post processed version is also shown (b).
Fig. 8. The possible domains which can be used by a metric to compare to an original image. Either the direct output of an encrypted bit stream for format compliant
encryption or an extraction of the plain text data which minimizes the disruptive effect of the encrypted data on the resulting bit stream. Another possibility would be post
processing to further accent the residual plain text data contained in an image.
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the quality targets of the encryption process. The targets where
chosen to contain high, medium and low residual information.
Under the assumption that a security metric can operate in the
encrypted domain it should be able to reliably order the encrypted
frames of each sequence for every sequence from highest to lowest
quality.
We generate two sets of ground truth, one for the high-med-
ium and one for the medium-low quality comparison, containing
ordered (based on quality) tuples for each frame. For a sequence S
containing frames …s s, , N1 S and high (SH), medium (SM) and low
(SL) quality versions we generate two sets of ordered (by quality)
tuples ( ) = {( ) … ( )}D S s s s s, , , , ,HM H M HN MN1 1 S S and likewise for DML.
Then a tested metric should also generate two sets with or-
dered tuples based on the estimated quality provided by the me-
tric
( )↦ ( ) = { ( ) … ( )}M o c Q S M q M s s s q M s s s, : , , , , , , , , ,HM H M N HN MN1 1 1 S S S ,
where
⎧⎨⎩( ) =
( ) ( ) ≥ ( )
( )
q M o c c
c c M o c M o c
c c
, , ,
, if , , ,
, otherwise,
1 2
1 2 1 2
2 1
and likewise for ( )Q S M,ML .
Based on these four sets the ability of a metric to order in a
given domain can be estimated byFig. 9. An example of how post proce( ) = | ( ) ∩ ( )|
| ( )|
+ | ( ) ∩ ( )|
| ( )| ( )
O S
Q S M D S
D S















values of 1 (100% correct ordering) or 0 (0% correct orderings, i.e.,
100% correct reverse ordering) show a high ability of the metric to
order correctly in the given domain. The difference between 1 and
0 is that image metrics can either measure similarity of images,
i.e., quality metrics, resulting in a normal ordering or the differ-
ence between images, i.e., impairment metrics, resulting in a re-
verse ordering. Results around 0.5 are akin to random decisions
and reﬂect the inability of the tested metric to perform in this
domain.
Furthermore, since the low quality range chosen is in (or at
least close to) the domain of content conﬁdentiality, i.e., the
rightmost column in Fig. 10 does not exhibit intelligible visual
content, this setting also serves as an indication whether an image
metric might be useful for content conﬁdentiality. While a good
performance on this evaluation does not necessarily mean a image
metric is qualiﬁed for content conﬁdentiality, a low performance is
a strong indicator that the metric is unﬁt for this task. Based on the
information which parts of the data have been encrypted and the
entirely evident differences in visual appearance, ground truth is
out of question here.
Note also that this is a proof by contradiction. That is, if a metricssing inﬂuences different metrics.
Fig. 10. A sample of the quality ordering test set based on the foreman sequence. Samples from the high, medium and low quality sequences are shown in the encryption,
extraction and processed domain.
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we can demonstrate that there are cases where it does not, then
this claim has been falsiﬁed.
3.2. Correspondence to HVS: conﬁdence
Besides the encryption application scenarios where a certain
quality is required (sufﬁcient and transparent encryption), further
examples for the importance of the quality notion are water-
marking where the resulting quality should not be below a certain
threshold, and of course, lossy compression. However, the notion
of quality in this cases is not as straightforward as it seems. On the
one hand we use the term quality in the context of the human
visual system (HVS), i.e., how a person consuming the content
would judge the quality. On the other hand, the term quality can
refer to the score returned by a (security) metric which is tied to
the quality in the HVS sense. This relation is not exact and it is not
inherently clear how to choose a metric which correlates to the
HVS quality which is targeted, although in practice Algorithm 1 is
usually applied.
Algorithm 1. Method for ﬁnding a target metric score based on a
target HVS quality.1:
2:
3:Chose a source image.
Alter the image until it ﬁts the perceived target quality.
Apply the security metric on the altered and original image,
the resulting metric score is the target quality.Fig. 11. Illustrations of zero false negative Vmin(D), zero false positives Vmax(D) and
conﬁdence D* for a MOS value of D¼3 is shown based on the IVC-SelectEncrypt
database and the LEG metric.While this results in a target quality which can be used, we
know nothing about how well this score actually reﬂects the hu-
man judgement, since it is well known that the correlation be-
tween human judgement and image metrics is not perfect. Inother words, how conﬁdent can we be in the choice of image
metric score in relation to the perceived quality?
In order to evaluate this, well known databases which contain
impaired and encrypted images and the perceived quality, in the
form of mean opinion scores (MOS), will be used. The databases
contain a set of points p representing impaired images with as-
sociated values pv for metric value and pd for MOS value, ordered
from lowest to highest quality. Based on a target MOS quality score
D two values can be calculated, Fig. 11 illustrates this.
Zero false negative: Vmin(D) refers to the metric value for which
the following holds: > ⇒ > ( )p D p V Dd v min . That is if the metric
score is below Vmin(D) we are sure that the perceived quality is
below the MOS quality score (D).
Zero false positives: Vmax(D) refers to the metric value for which
the following holds: > ( ) ⇒ >p V D p D.v max d That is if the metric
score is above Vmax(D) we are sure that the perceived quality is
H. Hofbauer, A. Uhl / Signal Processing: Image Communication 46 (2016) 60–75 67above the MOS quality score (D).
This also means that if a target metric quality score pvt is ob-
tained as given by Algorithm 1 we are assured that
( ) ≥ ≥ ( )V D p V Dmin vt max .
Thus we can deﬁne the conﬁdence D* for a metric score based
on a given perceived quality D as ≔| ( ) − ( )|V D V DD max min* . A con-






where S is the set of distinct MOS samples from the database.
Also note that we can interpret * as the average over D* ,
μ ( )∈D S D* , and consequently we can also calculate the standard
deviation, σ ( )∈D S D* . The reason for calculating s is to estimate how
stable the conﬁdence range is over the whole range of visual
quality. This has to be taken into account since it is well known
that image metrics exhibit different correlation to human judge-
ment depending on the quality range, e.g., [13].
For security metrics, and image metrics in general, the lower
μ ( )D* and σ ( )D* the better Algorithm 1 can be used to estimate a
target image quality metric score.
Furthermore, since the signal is reduced to statistical compo-
nents it is also of interest which shape the signal takes in con-
junction with μ ( )D* and σ ( )D* . The shape, together with the
monotonicity (see Section 3.3), can be used to indicate a possible
application scenario for a security metric, essentially whether the
security metric can be used for all quality ranges or only on high/
low quality applications.
By shape of the signal we mean the distribution of outliers,
where we deﬁne outlier based on the z score1 of a data point D as
μ
σ







we will deﬁne high outliers as outliers with < −z 1D and likewise
low outliers as outliers with >z 1D , indicating a higher and lower
conﬁdence respectively. Based on the distribution of high and low
outliers we can specify the shape of the signal as follows.
 A signal is stable if there are no outliers. That is, if − ≥ ≥z1 1D
holds for all ∈D S.
 A signal is biased if it consist of two clearly separable parts,
where one exhibits a good conﬁdence score ( D* small) and the
other a bad conﬁdence score ( D* large). We say the signal is
biased towards the quality where the good conﬁdence score is
located, i.e., where the metric is performing well.
That is, A signal is biased if there exists a Dt such that
< − ⇒ <z D D1D t and > ⇒ >z D D1D t or < − ⇒ >z D D1D t
> ⇒ <and z 1 D DD t . If a low D indicates a high quality we
specify the shape to be biased towards high quality if
< − ⇒ <z D D1D t or biased towards low quality if
> ⇒ <z D D1D t . If a low D indicates low quality the deﬁnition is
switched accordingly.
 A signal which is neither stable nor biased is considered
unstable.
3.3. Correspondence to HVS: monotonicity
What is required from image metrics in general is monotonicity
with regard to human observations. That is, if an image metric
decides that image A is of better quality than image B a human
observer should also prefer image A over image B. This is akin to
correlation but since the human visual system is not a linear1 NIST/SEMATECH e-Handbook of Statistical Methods, http://www.itl.nist.gov/
div898/handbook/, October 2013.system regular linear correlation is meaningless. Thus in order to
ascertain the correlation of an image metric and human observa-
tions the notion of monotonicity is utilized. Rank order correlation,
which essentially judges the monotonicity of the signals, is most
often used, usually in the form of Spearman's rank order coefﬁ-
cient (SROC) [33] or Kendall Tau (τ) [34].
Hofbauer and Uhl [13] pointed out that the correlation of an
image metric over the full quality range does not imply that a high
correlation is achieved for the low quality range. This is especially
important for security metrics since certain application scenarios
speciﬁcally target the low quality range of images, e.g., sufﬁcient
encryption. We cannot conﬁne the evaluation to the low quality
range since there are also applications for higher quality, i.e.,
transparent encryption. Also note that this is a dual property to the
conﬁdence in the sense that for the conﬁdence we evaluate the
relation of choosing a MOS value and evaluating the range of
metric scores which can potentially fall onto this MOS value.
Monotonicity is evaluated on speciﬁc sets of impairment and looks
at how well an increase in metrics score reﬂects an increase in the
MOS.
To properly evaluate security metrics for all encryption sce-
narios we will evaluate them using a high quality, a low quality
and a full quality range dataset. The reason to also include the high
quality range is to be inclusive in terms of possible application
scenarios. For example the upgrade to high deﬁnition quality from
PAL/NTSC quality is just as valid in terms of application scenarios
as from hand held quality to PAL/NTSC quality. As basis for the
evaluation we will use well known databases which contain mean
opinion score of human judgement over different impairments.
The SROC will be used for evaluation purpose, as is current best
practice for metric evaluation.
From security metrics we would expect a high correlation with
human judgement for the low quality range. While the low quality
range is often the target of encryption some transparent encryp-
tion schemes could target a higher quality, consequently, a good
correlation with human judgement on the high quality range is
also desirable.4. Evaluation
In this section we present the results of the evaluation process
as detailed in Section 3. Each evaluation contains a short de-
scription of the test data, the actual data from the evaluation and a
discussion. We remark that the discussion is focussed on the
evaluation methodology rather than the details of why and how a
metric fails a test. Discussing the latter would require an in-depth
description of how the metrics work, together with the explicit
details about the test set which is out of scope of this paper.
With respect to implementations, we used our own code2 for
LSS, ESS, LE, NSD, LFBVS, SSIM and PSNR. For VIF, we used the
implementation from the “MeTriX MuX Visual Quality Assessment
Package”,3 version 1.1. For CPA1, we used the MATLAB im-
plementation provided by Florent Autrusseau.4
4.1. Evaluation of the application domain
In order to evaluate the extraction versus encrypted domain
applicability of metrics, we used a number of standard sequences:
akiyo, bus, coastguard, container, ﬂower, foreman, mobile, news,
silent, tempete and waterfall.5 The ordering, as discussed in2 http://www.wavelab.at/sources/VQI
3 http://foulard.ece.cornell.edu/gaubatz/metrix_mux/
4 http://www.irccyn.ec-nantes.fr/autrusse/Softwares.html
5 Available for example at http://media.xiph.org/video/derf
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averaged over all the frames in a given sequence. Additionally we
provide the average over all sequences in order to simplify the
comparison. Table 1 shows the results for the encryption and ex-
traction domain. The optimal result would be for a metric to
perform equally well independent of the application domain.
From the overall averages it can be clearly seen that the per-
formance in the encrypted domain is worse than in the extraction
domain with the exception of LE. While LE performs better in the
encrypted domain than in the extraction domain, the performance
is still very low. In the extraction domain, most metrics still per-
form poorly; only LEG, SSIM, VIF, CPA1 and, to a lesser degree, ESS
exhibit good performance. Aside from the latter, all other security
metrics exhibit extremely poor performance.
This allows to conclude that application in the encrypted domain
should not be performed (although, it is routinely done in all corre-
sponding papers).
When looking closer at the detail information from the ex-
traction domain, some interesting effects can be observed. While
the performance of LEG, SSIM and VIF are consistently good, we
notice that there are cases where even a metric that shows good
performance can have problems. In the actual case the perfor-
mance of the ESS is signiﬁcantly reduced for the waterfall se-
quence and the CPA1 shows poor performance on the bus se-
quence. It stands to reason that there are other, untested, se-
quences which would lead to similar reduced performance for the
LEG, SSIM and VIF.
4.2. Evaluation of conﬁdence
In order to evaluate the conﬁdence, databases with either
pertinent content, i.e., encrypted images, or a large dataset with
distortions are optimal. The IVC-SelectEncrypt database [21] con-
tains various instances of JPEG 2000 transparent encryption, using
different encryption techniques, and is a useful tool for evaluating
conﬁdence with respect to encrypted images. It is the onlyTable 1
Results for the ordering given by Eq. (1) (Section 3.1) of high versus medium and me
averages over all the frames in a sequence as well as the average over all sequences is
LEG SSIM LSS ESS PSN
Results for the encryption domain (QM)
akiyo 0.168 0.500 0.496 0.441 0.5
bus 0.398 0.383 0.402 0.332 0.5
coastguard 0.500 0.391 0.340 0.434 0.5
container 0.246 0.484 0.207 0.391 0.3
ﬂower 0.191 0.430 0.527 0.410 0.4
foreman 0.289 0.481 0.492 0.410 0.5
mobile 0.340 0.481 0.500 0.305 0.4
news 0.430 0.500 0.395 0.418 0.7
silent 0.270 0.332 0.242 0.102 0.2
tempete 0.414 0.481 0.500 0.395 0.5
waterfall 0.422 0.492 0.488 0.461 0.7
average 0.334 0.450 0.417 0.373 0.5
Results for the extraction domain (QM)
akiyo 1.000 1.000 0.516 0.941 1.0
bus 0.996 1.000 0.512 0.969 0.9
coastguard 1.000 1.000 0.508 0.992 0.9
container 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.941 0.0
ﬂower 1.000 1.000 0.953 0.926 0.0
foreman 1.000 1.000 0.531 0.996 0.5
mobile 0.984 1.000 0.922 0.977 0.4
news 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.996 1.0
silent 1.000 1.000 0.902 0.981 0.5
tempete 1.000 1.000 0.570 0.992 1.0
waterfall 0.957 0.992 0.695 0.828 0.9
average 0.994 0.999 0.692 0.958 0.6database available containing encrypted visual data and corre-
sponding MOS. The test sets contained in the IVC-SelectEncrypt
database (and their abbreviation) are traditional encryption (trad),
truncation of the code stream (trunc), window encryption without
error concealment (iwind_nec), window encryption with error
concealment (iwind_ec), and wavelet packet encryption (res), for
detailed information see [35]. However, the IVC-SelectEncrypt
database has a rather small set of impairments, i.e., ﬁve per test
set, and is focused on JPEG 2000 only.
In order to get a more diverse view on the conﬁdence of me-
trics we additionally utilize the LIVE database [36] to supplement
the IVC-SelectEncrypt database of encrypted images. While the
LIVE database does not contain encrypted images, the quality
range of the images reaches from high to low quality; this makes it
at least relevant for transparent encryption where a certain target
quality is required. Furthermore, images in the low quality range
of the LIVE database exhibit strong distortions which can be
equated to encrypted images in the sense that strong distortions
mask a lot of the visual information. Consequently, the distorted
images can be used to assess how well a metric can identify in-
formation contained in a distorted/encrypted image; this is exactly
the property that we want from security metrics. An example of
these strong distortions is shown in Fig. 12 which contains an
encrypted image from the IVC-SelectEncrypt database as well as
heavily distorted versions of images from the LIVE database. These
examples illustrate that the LIVE database contains not only ima-
ges which are similar to the IVC-SelectEncrypt database in terms
of content masking, but also images which are clearly in the
quality realm of sufﬁcient encryption. The test sets contained in
the LIVE database (and their abbreviation in plots and ﬁgures) are
JPEG 2000 compression (jp2k), JPEG compression (jpeg), white
noise (wn), Gaussian blur (gblur), and bit errors in JPEG2000 bit
stream transmission over a simulated fast fading Rayleigh Channel
(fastfading), for detailed information see [37].
What we tried to do is to break it down the complex relation of
the conﬁdentiality as far as possible, to facilitate comparison,dium versus low quality sequences in the encryption and extraction domain. The
shown per image metric.
R LFBVS LE NSD VIF CPA1
27 0.500 0.609 0.481 0.449 0.496
55 0.516 0.895 0.426 0.383 0.250
82 0.590 0.754 0.422 0.508 0.254
48 0.500 0.777 0.563 0.586 0.035
45 0.488 0.996 0.398 0.488 0.395
08 0.504 0.547 0.453 0.500 0.481
57 0.512 0.688 0.492 0.453 0.473
42 0.500 0.500 0.457 0.363 0.496
50 0.602 0.992 0.375 0.320 0.148
00 0.500 0.742 0.481 0.449 0.465
15 0.508 0.539 0.512 0.492 0.496
12 0.520 0.731 0.460 0.454 0.363
00 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.945 0.094
92 0.500 0.500 0.461 0.981 0.234
96 0.457 0.500 0.246 1.000 0.008
00 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 0.004
63 0.418 0.500 0.473 0.984 0.094
00 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.996 0.000
34 0.500 0.500 0.410 0.984 0.020
00 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.996 0.000
78 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 0.000
00 0.500 0.500 0.481 1.000 0.000
30 0.500 0.500 0.246 0.981 0.008
81 0.489 0.500 0.438 0.988 0.042
Fig. 12. The lowest quality images of each test set in the LIVE database as well as one of the lowest quality images from the IVC-SelectEncrypt database.
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sures μ and s combined with the signal shape actually contain a
lot of information. The purpose of the detailed discussion in this
section is to relate to the reader the implications carried by the
‘scores’ μ, s and signal shape.
Fig. 13 shows the detailed evaluation of conﬁdence on the LIVE
database. For each metric, the ﬁgure shows a scatter plot of MOS
and metric values, the bounding curves ( )V Dmin and ( )V Dmax as
well as a plot of the local conﬁdence value D* . Table 2 lists the
conﬁdence scores μ ( )D* and σ ( )D* for each metric on the LIVE
database. In order to make the conﬁdence scores comparable a
pseudo normalization was used. Bounded metrics are normalized
and unbounded metrics, e.g., PSNR, are normalized by mapping
the range of occurring metric scores into [ ]0, 1 . For the calculation
of the signal shape the leading and trailing 10% of the MOS range
where not taken into account because, at the high and low ends of
the MOS, the difference in metric scores is limited due the
boundary of the metric range, see Fig. 13. This would result in false
outliers. The shape was calculated, similar to μ ( )D* and σ ( )D* , on
pseudo normalized local conﬁdence value D* . In Fig. 13, outliers
are indicated by down and up arrows for high and low quality
outliers, respectively.
For the IVC-SelectEncrypt database the accordant plot and
conﬁdence scores are given in Fig. 14 and Table 3, respectively.
Notice that while a MOS score of 0 is high quality on the LIVE
database, a MOS score of 0 represents low quality on the IVC-Se-
lectEncrypt database.
When it comes to conﬁdence we can safely state that none of
the metrics show good performance overall, i.e., none of the me-
trics are stable with a low μ ( )D* and σ ( )D* . However, for certain
test sets there are metrics with good performance, e.g., CPA1 on
the IVC-SelectEncrypt test set shows exceptionally high conﬁdence
and is stable. The CPA1 metric on the LIVE database, however,
shows extremely poor performance.
Let us consider the relation between shape, μ ( )D* and σ ( )D* .
The notional average performance is given by μ ( )D* . The amount of
deviation from the notional average is given by σ ( )D* . The way the
deviation is distributed is given by the signal shape. Contrariwise,σ ( )D* indicates the magnitude of the shape, i.e., assuming constant
μ ( )D* a biased signal will be biased to a higher degree if σ ( )D* is
higher.
Compare LEG and SSIM as an example: While LEG shows better
overall μ ( )D* and σ ( )D* , SSIM is much more biased than LEG, i.e.,
SSIM outperforms LEG where its bias is. Contrary to that, LEG
outperforms SSIM outside of the bias. This behavior is only iden-
tiﬁable when σ ( )D* is considered in conjunction with shape. In
particular, even though the LEG is biased, due to the small σ ( )D*
we can deduce that the bias is far smaller than the bias of the SSIM
(which exhibits a high σ ( )D* ).
A similar behavior can be observed for unstable shapes. A
metric with an unstable shape and a high σ ( )D* will have much
more severe outliers than one with a low σ ( )D* . This is nicely re-
ﬂected in the PSNR: Although unstable, the magnitude of the
outliers should be relatively small since the PSNR shows a low
σ ( )D* . This is exactly what we see in the plots of Figs. 13 and 14.
For a stable shape, μ ( )D* becomes more important since it
shows where the stable part of the conﬁdence lies. The LE metric
on the IVC-SelectEncrypt database is a prime example of this:
While it is stable, the actual conﬁdence score shows that it is
stable in the sense that it exhibits poor performance over the
whole quality range.
Regarding conﬁdence values and shape, it can be seen from
Tables 2 and 3 that can exhibit non-uniform behavior over dif-
ferent test sets. If this is the case, when calculating the overall
performance scores, the worst value should be taken into account.
What is also noticeable from the two tables is the fact that the
evaluated image and security metrics are more often biased to-
wards the high quality range. Indeed, on the IVC-SelectEncrypt
database which is the actual encryption database, not a single
metric is biased towards the low quality range. Furthermore, the
metrics biased towards the low quality range on the LIVE database,
i.e., LEG, VIF and LFBVS, are all biased towards high quality on the
IVC-SelectEncrypt database, and should thus be considered un-
stable overall.
To sum up the ﬁndings regarding the conﬁdence of the metrics
we can state the following: First, LE, LSS and CPA1 show extremely
Fig. 13. Conﬁdence plots for the LIVE database for different image metrics. The plot shows the scatter plot for the MOS and metric score pairs, the plot of Vmin(D), Vmax(D) and
D* .
Table 2
Average and standard deviation of normalized conﬁdence and signal shape on the LIVE database.
SSIM LEG VIF CPA1 LSS ESS LFBVS LE NSD PSNR
μ ( )D* 0.357 0.291 0.285 0.431 0.415 0.300 0.370 0.906 0.537 0.265
σ ( )D* 0.225 0.070 0.110 0.109 0.159 0.133 0.071 0.069 0.277 0.038
Signal shape Bias high Bias low Bias low Bias high Bias high Bias high Bias low Bias high Bias high Unstable
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Fig. 14. Conﬁdence plots for the IVC-SelectEncrypt database for different image metrics. The plot shows the scatter plot for the MOS and metric score pairs, the plot of Vmin
(D), Vmax(D) and D* .
Table 3
Average and standard deviation of normalized conﬁdence and signal shape on the IVC-SelectEncrypt database.
SSIM LEG VIF CPA1 LSS ESS LFBVS LE NSD PSNR
μ ( )D* 0.319 0.268 0.277 0.119 0.374 0.168 0.273 0.540 0.394 0.196
σ ( )D* 0.226 0.077 0.098 0.066 0.173 0.090 0.139 0.107 0.274 0.063
Signal shape Bias high Bias high Bias high Stable Bias high Bias high Bias high Stable Bias high Unstable
H. Hofbauer, A. Uhl / Signal Processing: Image Communication 46 (2016) 60–75 71
Table 4
Spearman's rank order correlation (SROC) for full, high and low quality range.
(a) SROC for the LIVE database
fast-fading gblur jp2k jpeg wn
Full quality range
SSIM 0.942 0.903 0.936 0.946 0.962
LEG 0.971 0.966 0.945 0.960 0.960
VIF 0.965 0.972 0.968 0.984 0.985
CPA1 0.881 0.927 0.958 0.962 0.984
LSS 0.843 0.916 0.953 0.970 0.965
ESS 0.933 0.888 0.929 0.949 0.886
PSNR 0.891 0.782 0.895 0.881 0.985
LFBVS 0.932 0.937 0.853 0.920 0.891
LE 0.241 0.236 0.076 0.766 0.228
NSD 0.815 0.803 0.741 0.806 0.657
High quality range
SSIM 0.517 0.815 0.710 0.879 0.875
LEG 0.652 0.792 0.638 0.761 0.734
VIF 0.632 0.782 0.797 0.920 0.891
CPA1 0.681 0.689 0.761 0.889 0.840
LSS 0.504 0.762 0.754 0.825 0.700
ESS 0.473 0.618 0.694 0.744 0.827
PSNR 0.517 0.662 0.676 0.801 0.869
LFBVS 0.289 0.707 0.393 0.651 0.572
LE 0.295 0.127 0.228 0.136 0.143
NSD 0.028 0.760 0.275 0.370 0.674
Low quality range
SSIM 0.662 0.487 0.635 0.339 0.802
LEG 0.893 0.872 0.617 0.699 0.804
VIF 0.937 0.920 0.646 0.829 0.911
CPA1 0.614 0.669 0.657 0.402 0.897
LSS 0.788 0.732 0.647 0.595 0.817
ESS 0.877 0.847 0.397 0.735 0.570
PSNR 0.611 0.408 0.510 0.046 0.897
LFBVS 0.863 0.849 0.391 0.702 0.659
LE 0.268 0.338 0.070 0.720 0.290
NSD 0.731 0.582 0.427 0.668 0.231
(b) SROC for the IVC-SelectEncryptdatabase
iwindec iwindnec resolution tradition truncation
Full quality range
SSIM 0.925 0.954 0.887 0.968 0.879
LEG 0.869 0.956 0.876 0.966 0.863
VIF 0.937 0.969 0.767 0.982 0.954
CPA1 0.925 0.953 0.906 0.967 0.959
LSS 0.888 0.907 0.955 0.948 0.948
ESS 0.868 0.894 0.933 0.906 0.860
PSNR 0.909 0.910 0.916 0.965 0.889
LFBVS 0.756 0.930 0.916 0.943 0.878
LE 0.136 0.579 0.562 0.550 0.201
NSD 0.698 0.922 0.790 0.757 0.523
High quality range
SSIM 0.652 0.863 0.714 0.975 0.835
LEG 0.713 0.852 0.643 0.920 0.610
VIF 0.729 0.907 0.143 0.885 0.662
CPA1 0.683 0.890 0.000 0.868 0.934
LSS 0.705 0.945 0.393 0.865 0.975
ESS 0.809 0.846 0.571 0.679 0.794
PSNR 0.636 0.857 0.500 0.879 0.830
LFBVS 0.521 0.863 0.250 0.698 0.723
LE 0.095 0.489 0.464 0.431 0.019
NSD 0.251 0.736 0.179 0.236 0.602
Low quality range
SSIM 0.191 0.694 0.644 0.680 0.695
LEG 0.141 0.823 0.490 0.652 0.181
VIF 0.518 0.732 0.823 0.913 0.832
CPA1 0.400 0.628 0.897 0.592 0.706
LSS 0.523 0.240 0.875 0.386 0.679
ESS 0.422 0.411 0.551 0.609 0.549
PSNR 0.251 0.474 0.688 0.663 0.541
LFBVS 0.188 0.562 0.507 0.416 0.022
LE 0.386 0.004 0.152 0.166 0.272
NSD 0.100 0.655 0.290 0.589 0.291
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on the IVC-SelectEncrypt database, it performs poorly on the LIVE
database; consequently, the overall performance of CPA1 is not
good. Second, LEG, VIF, ESS, LFBVS and PSNR – while not stable –
exhibit a low σ ( )D* and are thus closest to being considered good
metrics over the full quality range. However, in each case the μ ( )D*
is relatively high overall (at least from a security standpoint) and
thus could use some improvement, or replacement. Third, SSIM
and NSD show a strong bias towards the high quality range. While
the conﬁdence for these metrics is not good overall, the conﬁdence
over the high quality range is actually quite good. Consequently,
when the application scenario is known to target the higher
quality range, e.g., in transparent encryption, these metrics should
be considered.
4.3. Monotonicity for low quality images
The monotonicity of an image metric over the MOS for the full
quality range is what deﬁnes the quality of an image metric.
However, for transparent/sufﬁcient encryption it is more im-
portant that a metric has good monotonicity properties on the
lower quality range than on the full quality range. It is well known,
c.f. [13], that this can be a problem so it is necessary to study this
in more detail.
The absolute SROC values for the test sets of the LIVE database
are given in Table 4(a) for the full quality range, the low quality
range and the high quality range. In the table, high means SROC
>0.9 (marked bold); a SROC score of <0.5 means unsatisfactory
(underlined). For the IVC-SelectEncrypt database the same in-
formation is listed in Table 4(b).
In order to better compare the difference in high, low and
overall, rank order correlation for a given test set and database is
illustrated in Table 5 for the LIVE and IVC-SelectEncrypt database.
For each combination of test set and metric, the graphical entry
displays the range of possible SROC scores as background, with
SROC¼0 at the bottom and SROC¼1 at the top. The light gray
background bar shows the SROC value for the full quality range
while the smaller bars indicate the SROC score for the high quality
(left) and low quality range (right). What can be directly seen is
that the overall performance of a metric does not imply good
performance for either the high or low quality range, although
most metrics tend to perform better on the high quality range. In
some cases, a metric can even perform better on a limited quality
range than over the whole range of quality. For example, the VIF
performs better for the low quality end of resolution encryption on
the IVC-SelectEncrypt database than for the whole range of re-
solution. In other cases, the performance over the full quality
range is drastically reduced over the high and low parts of the
quality range. For example, the VIF performs poorly on the high
quality range for resolution encryption on the IVC-SelectEncrypt
database. For other test sets, the impact of either low or high
quality is minor and most likely due to the reduced number of
samples from the database, e.g., the VIF performs well for white
noise distortion (from the LIVE database) irrespective of the
quality range. This in essence shows that the actual performance
of an image metric is dependent on the distortion type as well as
the quality range. For most test sets and image metric combina-
tions, the SROC over the full quality range can at most be used as
an upper bound for the limited quality cases. However, there are
exceptions, e.g., VIF for the low quality range of the resolution test
set performs better than on the overall quality range for the same
test set.
With regard to security metrics and their performance on the
low quality range, there is no noticeable difference in behavior to
regular image metrics. Interestingly, though, for each test set the
best performance over the low quality range can be found among
Table 5
Visual representation of Spearman's rank order correlation ( | | ∈ [ ]SROC 0, 1 ) for the LIVE Image Quality Assessment and IVC-SelectEncrypt databases for full quality range
(light gray), low quality range (orange bar on the right) and high quality range (green bar on the left side).
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Comparing the high and low quality ranges, we can see that the
low quality range has a far higher number of unsatisfactory SROC
scores. This shows that image metrics tend to perform better at
differentiating the different strength in distortion for high quality
images. A high SROC score over the whole quality range indicates
that the metric can differentiate between high and low quality
images. In essence, image metrics which perform well on the
overall quality range can still be utilized to identify sufﬁcient en-
cryption, even though a metric which exhibits good performance
in the range of the quality threshold should be preferred. For
transparent encryption, where the goal is to ﬁnd the best image
below a certain threshold, monotonicity in the chosen quality
range becomes more important. In particular, the target quality is
a lot closer to the threshold, thus a high monotonicity (expressed
by a high SROC) is required.
Another interesting aspect of the high versus low quality test is
the fact that none of the tested metrics exhibits a better perfor-
mance on the high or low quality range for all test sets. Conse-
quently, the metrics cannot be reduced to a single SROC score and
a bias towards either high or low. There are cases where the per-
formance over both high and low quality is far worse than for the
whole quality range, e.g., LFBVS on the jp2k test set. Thus, in order
to evaluate whether an image metric can be used as a security
metric, tests regarding low and high quality performance have tobe conducted.
Summing up the monotonicity tests, we can state the follow-
ing: First, VIF, CPA1, SSIM, LSS and LEG perform best over the
whole quality range. LFBVS, PSNR and ESS also show a good be-
havior, while NSD and especially LE perform poorly.
Second, for the high quality range, most quality metrics still
show a decent performance. However, only SSIM, LEG, and PSNR
exhibit no unsatisfactory performance in a single test set.
Third, for the low quality range, only VIF exhibits good perfor-
mance over all test sets. All other metrics have at least two test
sets where their performance is unsatisfactory.5. Conclusion and future work
We have outlined an evaluation method for security metrics
based on practical application scenarios and considerations. These
methods were used to evaluate (1) state-of-the-art security me-
trics, (2) image metrics which are used as security metrics as well
as (3) state-of-the-art image metrics. A summary of the evaluation
and a basic evaluation score is given in Table 6. To simplify and
give a clear comparison between metrics, we assign a single score
to each metric based on its performance in the various evaluation
steps. In particular, for each step, we assign a score of 1 for desired
behavior and a penalty of 1 for a clear failure. The ﬁnal score is
Table 6
Summary of evaluation.
SSIM LEG VIF CPA1 LSS ESS PSNR LFBVS LE NSD
Application domain
Encryption 0.450 0.334 0.454 0.363 0.417 0.373 0.512 0.520 0.731 0.460
Extraction 0.999 0.994 0.988 0.042 0.692 0.958 0.681 0.489 0.500 0.438
Conﬁdence on the LIVE database
μ ( )D* 0.357 0.291 0.285 0.431 0.415 0.300 0.265 0.370 0.906 0.537
σ ( )D* 0.225 0.070 0.110 0.109 0.159 0.133 0.038 0.071 0.069 0.277
Signal shape Bias high Bias low Bias low Bias high Bias high Bias high Bias low Bias high Bias high Unstable
Conﬁdence on the IVC-SelectEncrypt database
μ ( )D* 0.319 0.268 0.277 0.119 0.374 0.168 0.196 0.273 0.540 0.394
σ ( )D* 0.226 0.077 0.098 0.066 0.173 0.090 0.063 0.139 0.107 0.274
Signal shape Bias high Bias high Bias high Stable Bias high Bias high Bias high Stable Bias high Unstable
Low quality SROC on the LIVE database
fastfading 0.662 0.893 0.937 0.614 0.788 0.877 0.611 0.863 0.268 0.731
gblur 0.487 0.872 0.920 0.669 0.732 0.847 0.408 0.849 0.338 0.582
jp2k 0.635 0.617 0.646 0.657 0.647 0.397 0.510 0.391 0.070 0.427
jpeg 0.339 0.699 0.829 0.402 0.595 0.735 0.046 0.702 0.720 0.668
wn 0.802 0.804 0.911 0.897 0.817 0.570 0.897 0.659 0.290 0.231
Low quality SROC on the IVC-SelectEncrypt database
iwind ec 0.191 0.141 0.518 0.400 0.523 0.422 0.251 0.188 0.386 0.100
iwind nec 0.694 0.823 0.732 0.628 0.240 0.411 0.474 0.562 0.004 0.655
resolution 0.644 0.490 0.823 0.897 0.875 0.551 0.688 0.507 0.152 0.290
trad 0.680 0.652 0.913 0.592 0.386 0.609 0.663 0.416 0.166 0.589
truncation 0.695 0.181 0.832 0.706 0.679 0.549 0.541 0.022 0.272 0.291
Comparison score, 1 or þ1 for insufﬁcient or good performance, 1 for conﬂict in signal shape
Score 3 1 6 0 3 0 2 5 11 12
H. Hofbauer, A. Uhl / Signal Processing: Image Communication 46 (2016) 60–7574the sum of the individual test scores. In Table 6, desired behavior is
indicated in bold and failure in italics.
For the application domain a sorting error of less than 10% is
considered good, while a performance around 50% (710%) is
considered a failure. For the conﬁdence, a score for μ7s of
0.370.1 is considered good, while a result of 0.570.25 is con-
sidered a failure. Regarding signal shape, we desire stable signals.
The signal shape will also be penalized if it does not agree on the
two test sets. For the quality and SROC, a value ≤0.5 is a failure
while an SROC greater than 0.9 is desirable. From the ﬁnal scores
in Table 6, we conclude that none of the security metrics are ﬁt to
perform as general purpose security metrics.
Regarding transparent and sufﬁcient encryption, the LE and
NSD metrics especially show that metrics engineered to ﬁt a cer-
tain application scenario cannot claim generality. Furthermore,
SSIM and PSNR, which are frequently used as security metrics, also
perform poorly. Most state-of-the-art image metrics hardly per-
form the security metric task adequately. Only VIF, apart from a
borderline conﬁdence score and stability, demonstrates good
performance.
Regarding content conﬁdentiality we cannot make a strong
statement due to lack of ground truth for recognizability tests.
However, the performance in the encrypted domain, during the
evaluation of the application domain, gives a strong indication that
none of the tested image metrics can perform the task of evalu-
ating the content conﬁdentiality.
The presented methodology for the evaluation of security
metrics should be used to asses newly developed metrics to pre-
vent similar shortcomings as those shown by the investigated
metrics. Table 6 gives a concise overview of the state-of-the-art
metrics, and can be used as a basis for comparison for new image
and security metrics.
5.1. Future work
The inability to properly evaluate image metrics with regard to
content conﬁdentiality naturally leads to the conclusion that moredata is required. This also holds true for the lower quality ranges
with respect to regular metrics, which would undoubtedly beneﬁt
from a dataset that is speciﬁcally designed for high impairment
cases. In future work, we will gather ground truth data for content
conﬁdentiality (and will also design protocols how to properly
capture human assessment for these data sets) and extend the
work presented in this paper to properly encompass content
conﬁdentiality. Furthermore, we intend to gather more data on the
low quality range as well, in order to better evaluate security
metrics for transparent and sufﬁcient encryption.Acknowledgments
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